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Abstract  
This article argues that critical psychological engagement with the field of human–
animal relations is largely absent, but of potential significance, and begins to outline 
more concretely what such a perspective might contribute, especially as a form of 
social psychology. The article provides a brief overview of the emerging psychology 
of human–animal relations and the extent to which it emphasises situated human–
animal interactions in real-world settings, including from the standpoint of animal 
participants. Recent elaborations of the “animal turn” outside of the discipline of 
psychology are considered, as they place fresh emphasis on human–animal 
interaction and interdependence and might further extend the boundaries of what 
counts as relations that matter in critical and social psychology. These foundations 
are argued to offer an invitation to critical psychology to engage more fully in the 
study of human–animal relations and enliven it as a result. 
 
Keywords: human-animal, more-than-human, multi-species, nonhuman, 
posthuman, speciesism, trans-species 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
 
To understand what animals have to say all the resources of science and of the humanities 
have to be put to work  
Bruno Latour 
 
Human nature is an interspecies relationship. 
Anna Tsing 
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Other species are fundamentally implicated in the activities of our own—“woven into 
the fabric of our social, political and psychological lives” (Birke, 2010, p. 338)—as 
metaphors, projections, stories, but also materially, as others we relate to and 
interact with in many different ways. Haraway's list of “human–animal worlds” where 
“ordinary beings-in-encounter” takes place is comprehensive: “in the house, lab, 
field, zoo, park, truck, office, prison, ranch, arena, village, human hospital, slaughter 
house, vet clinic, stadium, barn, wildlife preserve, farm, city streets, factory, and 
more” (Potts & Haraway, 2010, p. 322).1 Human–animal relations are complex, 
precarious, and fraught with paradox. The specific elements of Haraway's worlds, 
and the ways in which we conceptualise them, depend upon the society and culture 
in which we live (Descola, 2013), but also the psychological, interpersonal, and 
situational contexts through which human–animal relations are embodied, 
negotiated, and challenged (DeMello, 2012). They are fundamentally defined by 
power—involving socially structured hierarchy, oppression, injustice, and inequality 
(Carter & Charles, 2016; Cudworth, 2015). But they are also constituted by shared 
enjoyment, work, companionship, and loss (Haraway, 2008). Defined thus, human–
animal relations are a topic that should be of great interest to 
avowedly critical psychologists for whom relationality, situatedness, and power are 
integral to conceptualising experience and behaviour (Fox, Prilletensky, & 
Austin, 2009). Furthermore, a focus on nonhuman animals in relation to human 
animals offers a fascinating challenge to accepted understandings of who and what 
counts as meaningful participants in social relations in social psychology more 
generally. 
However, at the turn of the century, after acknowledging the scope and diversity of 
psychology, Melson (2002) was willing to risk a single generalisation about the 
discipline as a whole: “the study of human–animal relationships historically has been 
ignored and continues to resist attention” (p. 347). Between then and now, this 
lament has been echoed on various occasions (Birke, 2010; Serpell, 2009; 
Shapiro, 2017).2 The same has been said of social psychology in particular 
(Abell, 2013), in this case arguably reflecting the way the sub-discipline is 
fundamentally defined. Though definitions of the social in social psychology have 
always varied, they have tended to agree that it is exclusively about the study of 
the human, a point made obvious by a glance at any textbook definition, e.g., “the 
branch of psychology dedicated to the study of how people think about, influence 
and relate to each other” (Sutton & Douglas, 2013, p. 7). When they do make an 
appearance, nonhuman animals are presented as of interest to social psychologists 
only as rudimentary analogies—“some general principles” may be transferable but 
not “as a rule” (Hogg & Vaughan, 2013, p. 4). The related dismissal of the study of 
animals being of value only if we are interested in the “evolutionary origins” (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2013, p. 4) of human behaviour obscures the possibility that nonhuman 
and human animals reciprocally and meaningfully interact, relate, reciprocate, or 
share a contemporaneous social present (and past) in any meaningful sense. The 
present social behaviour of animals can only reveal the traces of our past behaviour. 
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Thus, in frontline assertions of what social psychology is about, it is still the case that 
animals are removed from the field of social relations (and, by implication, the 
situational, political, historical, and cultural), leaving humans as the only legitimate 
players. 
 
2 THE EMERGING PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN–ANIMAL RELATIONS 
However, this does not tell the whole story. There have long been notable 
exceptions in theory and research attempting to bring animals into the domain of 
psychology and sister disciplines (Davis & Balfour, 1992; Franklin, 1999; Netting, 
Wilson, & New, 1987; Serpell, 1986). The growing field of conservation psychology, 
meanwhile, stresses human–nature relations geared towards the goal of 
environmental sustainability (Saunders, 2003; Saunders, Brook, & Eugene 
Myers, 2006). Human–animal relations mainly feature in conservation psychology in 
terms of how different forms of human interaction with animals might improve 
physical and emotional well-being in humans (Clayton & Brook, 2005), or how they 
facilitate sustainable behaviour or a connection to nature more generally 
(Vining, 2003). The study of “zoo experiences” has notably addressed how this 
particular form of human–animal encounter might nurture stronger connections to, 
and a desire to care for, animals and nature more generally (Bruni, Fraser, & 
Schultz, 2008; Clayton, Fraser, & Burgess, 2011; Kazdin, 2009). 
More recently, it has been claimed that a “psychology of human–animal relations” is 
now emerging as a distinct field (Amiot & Bastian, 2015). Some of this work is 
aligned with established social psychology topics, for example, social categorisation 
of nonhuman animals (Bastian, Costello, Loughnan, & Hodson, 2012; Bratanova, 
Loughnan, & Bastian, 2011; Dhont, Hodson, Costello, & MacInnis, 2014; Loughnan, 
Haslam, & Bastian, 2010; Piazza, Landy, & Goodwin, 2014); “speciesism” as an 
attitude construct or basis for ingroup and outgroup identifications, prejudice, and 
discrimination (Costello & Hodson, 2014, 2010; Dhont et al., 2014; Dhont, Hodson, & 
Leite, 2016; Sevillano & Fiske, 2016); and associated behaviour (Bastian et 
al., 2012; Bastian & Loughnan, 2016; Dhont & Hodson, 2014). 
Clearly, aspects of this research orbit the established concerns of mainstream social 
psychology (and conservation psychology), but in their comprehensive review, Amiot 
and Bastian (2015) claim a distinctiveness for the field in its own right: “it directly 
captures the links and the dynamic interplay between humans and animals. The 
focus, therefore, of human–animal relations research is on reciprocal and interactive 
relations between humans and animals” (p. 6). However, while Amiot and Bastian 
clearly articulate and comprehensively thematise this emerging field, what they 
survey offers a fairly limited take on human–animal relations—if we understand 
relations to mean reciprocal encounters, interactions, and communication between 
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humans and animals in real-life contexts—despite the promise that this is precisely 
what makes the field distinctive. No doubt this absence reflects the focus of the near-
200 papers cited—largely experimental and quasi-experimental by design (less than 
10% involved any qualitative element); mostly concerned with measuring human 
attitudes towards, attachments to, perceptions, and categorisations of nonhuman 
animals; and/or the effects of animals on humans; and what was missed—interesting 
work directly relevant to an emerging psychology of human–animal relations but not 
necessarily in mainstream journals or filed obviously under “psychology” (e.g., 
Abell, 2013; Fuentes, 2010). Animals are rarely actually present in the 
methodological procedures of the research cited by Amiot and Bastian, nor 
ontologically present as contributing to and experiencing that interaction in mutually 
constitutive ways. Similarly, although animals arepresent in some of the research 
under the heading of conservation psychology cited above (e.g., zoo visits), an 
emphasis on their role as active subjects in encounter is rare. 
Sanders' dismissal of G.H. Mead's depiction of human–animal communication well 
over a century ago might seem appropriate here—“people interact[ing] with animals-
as-objects” (cited in Wilkie, 2015, p. 325) — though perhaps this is a little harsh. 
Studies are emerging, for example, that acknowledge how human perception of 
animals has consequences for how “we” treat “them” in routine everyday contexts, 
which in turn further shapes perception and justifies that treatment (Sevillano & 
Fiske, 2016). Nonetheless, much of the work in these emerging fields still appears to 
largely understand animals to be outside of the socialdynamics involved, present 
primarily as the passive recipients of particular framings and social categorisations or 
active predominantly in the ways they can impact on human variables. A critical and 
fully social psychology of human–animal relations demands theories and methods 
that more fully account for reciprocal interaction, from both “sides” (Shapiro, 2017); 
for how these interactions are formative for all involved; and for how they are 
implicated in broader political, social, cultural dynamics and power relations. A 
genuine shift of emphasis towards “reciprocal and interactive relations” involves not 
just a consideration of “how we interact with and relate to animals” but how, why, and 
when they interact with and relate to us. 
3 TOWARDS A CRITICAL PSYCHOLOGY OF HUMAN–ANIMAL 
RELATIONS 
What is the alternative? My argument here is that the tenets of critical (and critical 
social) psychology, as far as they can be agreed upon, can lend themselves to a 
creative and critical stretching of the psychology of human–animal relations, while 
ongoing work outside of psychology can challenge and extend the concerns of a 
fledgling critical psychology in this area. Regarding the first point, an important 
overarching orientation in critical psychology is an “assumption of relationality” 
(Stanley, 2012, p. 636). As articulated by Gergen (2009, 2011), such an approach 
conceptualises experience as an “outcome or expression of fundamental 
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relatedness” and displaces the individual as “the primary source or ontological 
foundation of being” (both Gergen and Hosking, cited in Stanley, 2012, p, 636). A 
consideration of relationality extends to other shared concerns of critical psychology, 
including the deconstruction of taken-for-granted but historically, socially, and 
situationally contingent categories through which we relationally make sense of 
reality (Gough, 2017); highlighting, understanding, and addressing the workings of 
power (Elder-Vass, 2012; Ibañez & Iñiguez, 1997); especially in terms of the way 
inequalities and injustices intersect to permeate and structure social relations 
(Bowleg, 2017); and for how power is challenged and resisted, especially by people 
and groups who are oppressed and marginalised (Fox et al., 2009). 
However, to date, avowedly critical psychological approaches have made few 
inroads into a consideration of human-animal relations, despite numerous 
precedents being set (e.g., Opotow, 1993; Plous, 1993; Serpell, 1986, 2009). While 
critical psychology has challenged the individualist ontology of mainstream 
psychology and has had a hand in the development of an alternative, relational, and 
dialogical ontology, which, it is argued, better reflects the reality of being-in-the-world 
(Gergen, 2009), the theoretical development of “relational being” has also taken 
place within an exceptionally human conceptual framework (e.g., 
Gergen, 2015, 2016). The task in hand then is to make a case for how a psychology 
of human–animal relations might benefit from the application of the tenets of critical 
psychology and to outline developments in the study of human–animal relations 
elsewhere that might have generative outcomes for the field of critical psychology. 
4 THE “ANIMAL TURN” AND A HUMAN–ANIMAL RELATIONAL 
ONTOLOGY 
The challenge for a critical psychology of human–animal relations is to embrace the 
deeper “animal turn” discernible in the last decade or so in the humanities and 
sciences (Shapiro, 2017). Shapiro (2017) expresses this as “a shift from a major 
focus on the social construction of other animals to attempts to get at ‘animals as 
such’, as they actually experience the world” (p. 3), and, we might add, as they 
experience it in relation to and with humans (Despret, 2013). To consider “animals 
as such” as participants in social relations requires radically rethinking how we 
approach human–animal relations conceptually/ontologically and methodologically in 
psychology. To do so takes us beyond the task identified by Amiot and Bastian—
systematically applying the insights of established psychological topics to human–
animal relations. Conceptually, we must imaginatively extend the relational ontology 
noted above, which is a central tenet of many versions of feminist and critical 
psychology. A relational ontology, to reiterate, assumes “that the relations between 
entities are ontologically more fundamental than the entities themselves” 
(Wildman, 2010, p. 55); “that entities come to exist through relations”; and 
subsequently, that the individual is no longer conceived of as “a presupposition, but 
rather as a process” (Collomb, 2011, p. 59). 
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There is already plenty of fascinating work beyond and between additional 
disciplines attempting to extend this logic to incorporate both human and nonhuman 
entities, hence Shapiro's evocation of an “animal turn” (Despret, 2016; 
Haraway, 2016; Kohn, 2013; Latour, 2005; Tsing, 2015). Haraway (2014) notes with 
characteristic eloquence how this has now become a prevalent perspective in the 
natural sciences: “There has been an explosion within the biologies of multispecies 
becoming with; understanding that to be a one at all you have to be a one of many, 
and that is not a metaphor; it is about the tissues of being anything at all; and that 
those who are have been in relationality all the way down”. Wolfe's (2010) version of 
posthumanism similarly asserts “a shared trans-species being-in-the-world 
constituted by complex relations of trust, respect, dependence, and communication” 
(p. 141). We also see attempts to articulate a human–nonhuman relational ontology 
in fields as diverse as archaeology (Watts, 2013), anthropology (Dugnoille, 2014; 
Kirksey & Helmreich, 2010; Kohn, 2013; Latour, 2014), geography (Whatmore, 2006; 
Wright, 2015), sociology (Charles, 2014; Cudworth, 2015; McCarthy, 2016; 
Sanders, 2007; Wilkes, 2013; York & Longo, 2017) criminology and legal studies 
(e.g., Agnew, 1998; Sollund, 2011); philosophy and cultural studies (Haraway, 2003; 
Litchfield, 2013; Plumwood, 2002); natural history (Henderson, 2012); feminism 
(Adams, 2015; Kemmerer, 2011; Potts, 2010); and the growing interdisciplinary field 
of human–animal studies (HAS) (Birke & Hockenhull, 2012; DeMello, 2012; 
Peggs, 2012; Wilkie, 2015)—dedicated to finding “new ways of thinking about 
animals and about human-animal relationships” (Potts, 2010, p. 291). Evidence of a 
growing understanding of interrelatedness incorporates animals, but also extends to 
other nonhuman forms, beings, things, places, and elements of the more-than-
human world (Anderson, Adey, & Bevan, 2010; Bawaka Country et al., 2016; 
Ingold, 2005).3 
5 SPECIESISM AND TRANS-SPECIES PSYCHOLOGY 
An additional rallying point for the development of a critical psychology of human–
animal relations is the conceptualisation of speciesism—“the taken-for-granted belief 
that humans are superior to and have the right to dominate all other creatures, and 
that ‘humanity’ alone bears the hallmarks of intelligence and sentience” (Potts, 2010, 
p. 292).4 Others take the concept of speciesism beyond individual belief or attitude, 
to argue that it is also deeply inscribed in language, culture, and society (Carter & 
Charles, 2016; Cole & Morgan, 2011); clearly echoing the tenets of critical 
psychology. Bradshaw and Watkins (2006) go as far as to state that “human–animal 
differencing comprises much of what defines western human collective identity and 
an ego construct based on what animals are presumed to lack” (p. 7).5 Speciesism 
at this level is argued to be embedded in the material and structural patterning of 
societies and subjectivities. It is evident in, for example, the discursive objectification 
of animals and the associated denial of agency (Adams, 2010), which is in in turn 
inseparable from the rationalisation and routinisation of animal violence and killing in 
industrial agriculture (Cudworth, 2015). 
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In fact, the most significant point of human–animal interaction in terms of global 
scale and scope is farming (Cudworth, 2015; Potts & Haraway, 2010), allied with the 
slaughter and butchery industries (Hamilton & McCabe, 2016; see Footnote 1). Of all 
the domesticated animals alive at any moment, 99% are animal agriculture 
commodities (Cudworth, 2015, p. 1; Williams & DeMello, 2007). Cudworth cites a 
body of research which documents the routinised animal violence and killing involved 
in the industrial farming of animals. As she states, “the statistics are of staggering 
proportions”: At least 55 billion land-based nonhuman animals are killed in the global 
farming industry annually, and this figure is growing year-on-year.6 Yet in established 
coverage of human–animal relations as a psychological topic, the chains of 
interaction that constitute industrial agriculture are only beginning to feature as points 
of interaction, with an emphasis on individuals who eat meat (Bastian & 
Loughnan, 2016; Dhont & Hodson, 2014)—pets, therapy, zoos, parks, and 
wilderness are much more likely focal points (e.g., Clayton & Myers, 2009). 
Recent experimental research has operationalised the concept of speciesism as a 
psychological variable, raising interesting questions about the intersections between 
speciesism and other forms of prejudice, even if it tends to individualise them (e.g., 
Bastian et al., 2012; Bratanova et al., 2011; Costello & Hodson, 2014; Dhont et 
al., 2014; Loughnan et al., 2010). Trans-species psychology, by contrast, is a recent 
development which consolidates a critique of speciesism in aligning itself with 
“liberation psychology”—a term familiar to critical psychologists (Bradshaw & 
Watkins, 2006). It is normally applied to human suffering in the context of 
colonialism, patriarchy, and capitalism and claims that psychology should be utilised 
to highlight and challenge the “oppression, marginalization, exploitation, forced 
migration, and genocide that animal communities experience” (Bradshaw & 
Watkins, 2006, p. 2). Bradshaw (2010) cites Ignacio Martín-Baró's claims about 
liberation psychology: “If we want psychology to make a significant contribution to 
the history of our peoples... we have to redesign our theoretical and practical tools, 
but to redesign them from the standpoint of the lives of our own people: from their 
sufferings, their aspirations, and their struggles” and simply adds that “the same 
holds when considering other species” (p. 416). 
In wedding speciesism with the conceptualisation of intersectionality, feminist theory 
has taken this argument further (Jones, 2010; Parry, 2010; Potts, 2010; 
Twine, 2010). Intersectionality refers to “the ways in which different forms of 
prejudice, oppression and marginalization are intricately connected and cannot 
effectively be addressed without reference to their interrelationships” (Potts, 2010, p. 
295). Adams (1994, 2015) has been at the forefront of work in this area, making the 
link between, for example, cultural constructions of masculinity and eating meat, and 
the objectification of women and animals (Cudworth, 2011). These are not 
coincidentally similar social categories, they are “interlocking constructions of 
difference” which reflect and maintain hierarchies of power and control (Twine, 2010, 
p. 398). Similarly, “dehumanisation” discourses legitimatising the exploitation and 
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oppression of others “makes sense only in the context of the routine exploitation of 
animals” (Jones, 2010, p. 371). As Potts (2010) states, “the discrimination and 
maltreatment of nonhuman species occurs in relation to, and is complicit with, other 
forms of oppression, prejudice and marginalization affecting humans” (p. 299). 
Rather than approaching human–animal relations as a separate issue from the 
existing concerns relating to exploitation, inequality, and injustice then, 
intersectionality encourages critical psychologists to search for the points of 
connection between them. 
To return to trans-species psychology, besides offering a critique of speciesism, it 
proposes a constructive alternative that explicitly asserts a trans-species relational 
ontology by emphasising interdependencies and interrelationships between humans 
and other species in theory and research (e.g., Bradshaw, Capaldo, Lindner, & 
Grow, 2008; Bradshaw & Watkins, 2006; Buckley & Bradshaw, 2010). We might 
characterise trans-species psychology as an attempt to foster a relational ontology 
that extends beyond species boundaries, in a way that underpins and informs its 
more overtly political project of challenging speciesism and that connects directly 
with the “animal turn” underway in the humanities, social, and natural sciences noted 
above. Exposing critical psychology to these radical developments means more than 
just acknowledging that nonhuman animals shuffle on to the stage of social 
existence from time to time. It means recognising “that we only can begin to 
understand what it means to be human and animal from the situational and 
positional fluidity of the human–animal divide as revealed through human–animal 
interactions” (McNiven, 2013, p. 98). 
6 HUMAN–ANIMAL METHODOLOGIES 
Framing human–nonhuman animal relations in terms of speciesism is an invitation 
for critical theoretical perspectives and methodological approaches to contribute to a 
“climate of problematisation” (Curt, 1994) and an “unsettling [of] mainstream 
practices” (Tuffin, 2005, p. 167). Discourse analysis, for example, might be utilised to 
evidence claims about speciesism as pervasive, taken-for-granted, and culture-wide, 
whether in everyday conversations, newspapers, advertising, online, or in industry 
documents (Arcari, 2016; Cole & Morgan, 2011; Morgan & Cole, 2011; Sneijder & Te 
Molder, 2005; Stibbe, 2001). To analyse the embeddedness of ideologies in banal, 
everyday forms is to follow a now established strand in critically oriented social 
psychology (Billig, 1995). A critical impetus shifted the focus of psychologies of 
prejudice and discrimination away from a reductive focus on internal traits and 
states, towards the realm of shared language and social construction (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1992). It can make a similar move in addressing how humans collectively 
construct contingent, motivated, understandings of mutually reinforcing categories 
that have material implications for self and (nonhuman) other. 
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All this said, a social constructionist and discursive orientation might still be 
concerned exclusively with how humans construct animals, even if it is also 
committed to understanding the implications of those constructions for animals 
(human and nonhuman). How to translate a commitment to a relational ontology that 
includes human and nonhuman animals into a methodology? In making sense of 
human–animal relations as multidirectional, we cannot readily presume ready access 
to a shared system of language or other forms of symbolisation (though see Alger & 
Alger, 2003, 1999). Critical psychology has leaned heavily (though not exclusively) 
towards qualitative methods, focusing on interaction and communication, especially 
language-based (Braun, Clarke, & Gray, 2017). Yet Shapiro (2017) holds out hope 
for qualitative methods, including discursive, in that they “rely on the objects of or, 
better, partners in a study being subjects – that is having these structures of 
experience – and thereby being accessible either through direct communication or 
expressive behavior” (p. 4). We might add that qualitative methods in psychology 
have increasingly strived to incorporate embodied, prelinguistic, and other-than-
language forms of experience and relatedness—as aspects of reality as it is 
subjectively and interpersonally experienced (Langdridge, 2017). It has also 
championed participatory and action-oriented research methods, working with 
marginalized groups or communities, to challenge injustice and facilitate social 
change (Burton & Kagan, 2005). 
Striving to find a channel for beings constituted as “others” to be represented, 
expressed, communicated, through sympathetic interpretation and/or on their own 
terms, is a reasonable basis for developing “new forms of listening,” and attunement 
to “alternative modalities of communication” (Bradshaw & Watkins, 2006, p. 14; see 
also Brigstocke & Noorani, 2016). The work of devising the methodological tools to 
do this is far from settled (Dowling, Lloyd, & Suchet-Pearson, 2016). However, we 
need not wait for a “pure” form of listening or communicating, as no doubt we will 
always remain on the “anthropocentric side” in studying such relations 
(Bernacchi, 2013 p. 144). A practical step for a meaningful and productive research 
agenda in the field is the study of the dynamics of human–animal relations in 
different real-life social settings, whether this be observing present-day practices or 
pursuing historical case studies (Charles, 2014; Hamilton & McCabe, 2016). This 
study is underway in related disciplines, extending two methods—ethnography and 
participatory research—that are established tools in critical and qualitative 
psychology (e.g., Case, Todd, & Kral, 2014; Tolman & Brydon-Miller, 1997; Willig & 
Stainton-Rogers, 2008). 
The first, multispecies ethnography, emerges from anthropology. It encompasses 
“ethnographic research and writing that is attuned to life's emergence within a 
shifting assemblage of agentive beings” (Ogden, Hall, & Tanita, 2013, p. 6) and 
strives “to place a fresh emphasis on the subjectivity and agency of organisms 
whose lives are entangled with humans” (Kirksey & Helmreich, 2010, p. 545). 
Attunement and listening—these are two of the required qualities highlighted above 
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as requirements of a trans-species psychology. In practice, multispecies 
ethnographies to date involve paying greater attention to “research sites that foster 
multispecies encounters” (Ogden et al., 2013; p. 7) such as those found in 
Haraway's list of “human–animal worlds” described earlier. Ethnographic techniques 
are applied to explore how multiple species actively contribute to the constitution of 
the social reality being studied. 
Examples include the study of human and macaque monkey interaction in shared 
spaces in Bali (Fuentes, 2010); human–horse “co-domestication” in horse riding 
communities (Maurstad, Davis, & Cowles, 2013; see also Birke & Hockenhull, 2012; 
Despret, 2013); and ethnographies of workplaces defined by human–nonhuman 
animal interaction such as abattoirs, laboratories, and farms (Birke, 2003; Hamilton & 
McCabe, 2016). Much of this work explicitly strives to provide “case studies that 
place value on more-than-human animals as genuine dialogic participants in the 
world” (Schutten, 2015, p. 2), but there are also explicit attempts to incorporate many 
other species, beings, and things, including plants and microorganisms (e.g., 
Tsing, 2012), easily neglected by a focus on “human–animal” alone (Smart, 2014). 
Many different logics are drawn upon to interpret and frame these encounters, 
including Latour's network theory (2005; e.g., Nimmo, 2011, 2010), Deleuze and 
Guatarri's (1987) rhizome (e.g. McLeod, 2014), and Haraway's (2003, 2008) 
conceptualisation of companion species (e.g., Lorimer, 2010).7 
More-than-human participatory research is mostly closely associated with human 
geography (Bastian, Jones, & Moore, 2016) and attempts to pay closer attention to 
the ways in which the agency of nonhuman entities “saturates our research 
interactions” (Wright et al., 2012 p. 52). Work to date involves place-based 
collaboration with indigenous practitioners to generate relational narratives of human 
and more-than-human “emergent belonging” (Wright, 2015); though Bastian et al. 
(2016) open up a number of future directions that such a methodology might take. 
There are earlier precedents. More-than-human participatory research proposes a 
form of co-operative inquiry that parallels the earlier development of participatory 
action research (PAR), now an established approach in community and critical 
psychology (Brydon-Miller, 1997). In fact, since the first edition of Reason and 
Bradbury's Handbook of Action Research (2001), the “skills” of co-operative enquiry 
have included “empathy, resonance and attunement, participating in the way of 
being of other people and the more-than-human world … it is about being open to 
the meaning we give to and find in our world” (Heron & Reason, 2001, p. 184). 
Such skills are especially important at the trans-species level, where researcher and 
participant cannot depend on a shared language as a basis for communication. 
Without it, the researcher must rely on sympathetic observation of animals and/or 
listening to the narratives of those humans who live and work closely with them 
(Merskin, 2011)—which returns us to the same methodological ground as 
multispecies ethnography. The only significant difference is that the goals of PAR 
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perhaps allow the researcher to more explicitly frame their work in politicoethical 
terms, and therefore more readily aligns it with trans-species psychology, i.e., “to ask 
questions in service of those one is speaking of and engaging with so that the 
desires of that group can be advanced by the initiating actions that transform the 
current state of affairs into one that would be more desirable from the participants' 
point of view” (Merskin, 2011, p. 147). These are just two broad extensions of 
methodological approaches, and as practical tools, they are still in their infancy and 
advocated with caution. But they will be familiar to those with an interest in critical 
psychology and might appeal to some as having the potential to further explore the 
complexities and human–animal social relations. 
7 CONCLUSION 
Why do we need a critical psychology of human–animal relations? After all, there are 
some established topics, such as animal-assisted therapy, growing mainstream 
coverage (e.g., Clayton & Myers, 2009), and an emerging psychology of human–
animal relations has been identified (Amiot & Bastian, 2015). We need it because 
there are still important questions to ask about how the relationships between human 
and animals should be conceptualised and studied in psychology. First, we must 
accept that there is more at stake than the successful application of psychological 
knowledge to a historically neglected topic area. While there is great benefit in 
thinking of human–animal relations as subject to similar psychological dynamics as 
human–human relations—be it attachment, intergroup processes, or helping 
behaviour (Amiot & Bastian, 2015)—there are wider, arguably more important 
implications. Human–animal relations are central to pressing environmental and 
welfare issues, including industrial animal farming (in terms of ethical and welfare 
issues and its contribution to environmental damage and climate change), species 
loss and habitat destruction (land, water, and air), and associated loss of 
biodiversity. The concept of the Anthropocene—a proposed definition of a new 
epoch to mark the unprecedented influence of human activity on all forms of 
planetary life (Steffen et al., 2011; Steffen, Crutzen, & McNeill, 2007)—in particular is 
an invitation to question human–animal and human–nonhuman boundaries and 
develop models of reciprocity and interdependence (Adams, 2017). Taking human–
animal relations seriously means addressing how those relations embody and are 
embedded in intersecting social, political, and psychological processes. 
I make the call for a critical and social psychology of human–animal relations here 
not merely to fill a gap in the literature then but because it is part of an urgent 
political project which can only be addressed through transformative social change. 
The loss of biodiversity, decimation and destruction of countless species, and wider 
ecological devastation that herald the Anthropocene are a reflection of the profound 
interrelatedness of human–nonhuman and point to the necessity of finding ways to 
foster more equitable, just, and sustainable relations (Abell, 2013; Bekoff & 
Bexell, 2010). The challenge is formidable, but “we must somehow… reinvent the 
Pre-proof author version 
 
 12 
conditions for multispecies flourishing… in a time of human-propelled mass 
extinctions and multispecies genocides that sweep people and critters into the 
vortex” (Haraway, 2016, p. 130). 
Kidner (2001) recognised, back at the turn of the century, that the “discontinuity 
between the ‘animal’ and ‘human’ realms is beginning to come under fire” (p. 94), a 
process that has hastened ever since. It is a trajectory reflected in diverse activities 
and forms, including the academic disciplines described above, but also in 
contemporary fiction, film-making, photography, journalism, activism, and 
campaigning.8 As a society, we are increasingly placing our relationship to other 
species under close scrutiny, amplified by the growing awareness of unprecedented 
human influence on planetary life, often with devastating results. I have argued that 
this situation requires us, as critical and social psychologists, to more fully extend our 
understanding of the social and the psychological beyond the species barrier into 
terrain that is increasingly being occupied by ideas and arguments that are pressing 
in on the discipline from all sides. 
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1 A consideration of primary points of interaction also reveals the extent and variety of human-animal 
relations: in the consumption of food (meat, milk, eggs) – by humans, but also by other animals in 
different settings; as companions, guides and partners (pets, therapy, sight and hearing guides, 
agility); as servants and/or sources of labour (horse power, transportation, messengers); clothing and 
ornament (such as trophies, shoes, handbags); experimental subjects (psychology, medicine, 
cosmetics); as spectacle and entertainment (zoos, aquariums, circuses, hunting, racing, fighting). 
2 There are exceptions – two relatively established areas in psychology that explicitly address human-
animal relations (Potts, 2010). The first is the study of the health benefits (almost exclusively for 
humans) of contact with animals – in variations of animal-assisted therapy; and less formally, e.g. 
contact with household pets. This field has developed in parallel with the growing popularity of AAT. It 
has benefited from, and contributed to, a broader affirmation of the human-animal relationship as a 
psychologically meaningful relationship, though psychological research has historically focused on 
human benefits. The second examines the apparent correlation between human abuse of nonhuman 
animals and other humans (referred to in the literature as ‘the link’): violence towards animals in 
childhood as predictor of violence towards adults in adulthood; violence towards animals in adulthood 
as signal of abuse in childhood; and understanding how animals and humans can be mutual victims 
of domestic violence. 
3 The more-than-human world was coined by US philosopher David Abram to refer to all forms of 
earthly life – animals, plants, landforms; and to make salient the fact that the world exceeds the 
human in ways we are nonetheless a part of, the human and more-than-human world. 
4 The term was originally defined by the British psychologist Richard Ryder, and taken up by Peter 
Singer, Ruth Harris and others in advocating a philosophical and ethical defence of animal rights 
(Godlovitch, Godlovitch & Harris, 1971). 
5 A special issue of Feminism & Psychology dedicated to speciesism is perhaps the closest we have 
come to an emerging critical psychology of human-animal relations, drawing on feminist theory 
(Adams, 2010; Birke, 2010; Potts & Haraway, 2010); ecofeminism specifically (jones, 2010; Twine, 
2010), and trans-species psychology (Bradshaw, 2010; Potts, 2010). Though a number of its authors 
have been at the forefront of interdisciplinary developments in the study of human-animal relations 
before and since, including Carol J Adams, Donna Haraway, Lynda Birke, Annie Potts and Gay 
Bradshaw, the themes and arguments established here have not yet been taken up and developed by 
critical psychologists in significant numbers. The various contributions to this issue are woven into the 
following discussion. 
6 For the historian Yuval Noah Harari, ‘this is why the fate of farm animals is not an ethical side issue. 
It concerns the majority of Earth’s large creatures: tens of billions of sentient beings, each with a 
complex world of sensations and emotions, but which live and die on an industrial production line’ 
(Harari, 2015). 
7 See Ogden et al (2014) for an overview of recent research and logics of interpretation. 
8 See for example Helen Macdonald’s H Is For Hawk (2014; winner of the Samuel Johnson Prize and 
the Costa Book of the Year award in 2014); Jo-Anne McArthur’s We Animals photo-documentation 
work http://weanimals.org; Chris Jordan’s Midway series 
http://www.chrisjordan.com/gallery/midway/#CF000313%2018x24; the documentaries Blackfish (dir: 
Cowperthwaite, 2013), Speciesism: The Movie (dir: Devries, 2013) and Unlocking the Cage (2016). 
We are also witnessing nascent campaigns and policies explicitly aiming to defend and extend the 
legal rights of nonhuman animals, such as the Nonhuman Rights Project, which is working case-by-
case in the United States to try and establish legal personhood for nonhuman animals (Wise, 2015). 
                                               
